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Abstract—This paper considers wireless-powered cooperative
jamming (CJ) to secure communication between a transmitter
(Tx) and an information receiver (IR), in the presence of an
energy receiver (ER) which is termed as a potential eavesdrop-
per. The full-duplex jammer harvests energy from the Tx’s
information signal and transmits jamming signal at the same
time, where the jamming signal not only confounds the ER
(potential eavesdropper) but also charges the ER. Our goal is
to maximize the secrecy information rate by jointly optimizing
the power allocation at the Tx and jammer while maintaining the
harvested energy requirement of the ER. The studied problem
is non-convex and we propose the optimal solution based on
the Lagrange method. Simulation results show that the proposed
scheme significantly outperforms the benchmark schemes.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT), power allocation,
cooperative jamming (CJ).
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, physical layer security has been investigated ex-
tensively to secure wireless communications. For the main
methods of physical layer security, artificial noise (AN) and
cooperative jamming (CJ) are very promising. For the former
case, the AN signal is transmitted into the null space of the
desired signal to degrade the wiretap channel [1]. While for
the later the external jammer transmits the jamming signal to
combat against eavesdropping [2].
On the other hand, wireless information and power transfer
becomes an appealing solution to prolong the lifetime of
energy-constraint nodes. However, the energy receivers (ERs)
are usually deployed relatively closer to the transmitter (Tx),
thus the information receivers (IRs) are easily eavesdropped
by the ERs. A handful of works have considered the physical
layer security by wireless energy transfer [3]–[7]. For instance,
in [4], the hybrid base station first charges the energy-free
source and then performs CJ when the source transmits
information to the multiple destinations. In [5], multiple
wireless-powered jammers were used to secure two-hop relay
networks by designing the beamforming matrices. The authors
in [6] conducted wireless power transfer for the jammer and
analyzed the throughput. An “accumulate-and-jam” protocol
was proposed in [7] where the jammer was powered by the
source and secrecy performance metrics were investigated by
Markov chain. Note that the above works require a dedicated
energy signal to power the jammer.
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Fig. 1: System model of the self-powered secrecy SWIPT.
In this paper, we consider the secrecy communication in an
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) based si-
multaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT)
system, which consists of one Tx, one IR, one ER (potential
eavesdropper) and one friendly jammer as shown in Fig. 1. We
assume that the Tx has constant energy and the jammer has no
embedded power supply thus needs to harvest energy from the
Tx. The Tx, IR and ER are equipped with a single-antenna,
while the friendly jammer has two antennas, one for harvesting
energy from the Tx’s information signal to the IR and the other
for transmitting jamming signals to the ER simultaneously
by the full-duplex capability. By assuming that the jamming
signal can be cancelled at the IR but cannot be removed
at the ER (potential eavesdropper), we jointly optimize the
transmit power of the Tx and jammer over subcarriers (SCs)
to maximize the secrecy rate of the IR while satisfying the
energy requirement of the ER. Optimal solution is derived to
solve the non-convex optimization problem. Simulation results
show that the huge superiority of the proposed method over
conventional schemes.
Compared with the works of wireless-powered CJ [4]–[7],
the differences of our paper are three-fold: 1) We consider a
secure SWIPT system where a full-duplex jammer is wireless-
powered by the information signals sent to the IR. There is no
need for dedicated energy signal as in other related works; 2)
By adopting the cancellation mechanism of jamming signal at
the IR, the secrecy performance of the system can be greatly
enhanced; 3) Optimal power allocation of the Tx and jammer
are adapted over SCs to explore frequency flexibility.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an OFDM-based secrecy SWIPT network con-
sisting a Tx, an IR, an ER (potential eavesdropper) and
a jammer as shown in Fig. 1. The Tx, IR, and ER are
equipped with a single-antenna, while the jammer is equipped
with two antennas with one for energy harvesting and the
other for transmitting jamming signal. That is, when the Tx
2transmits information-bearing signal to the IR, the ER harvests
energy and may intercept the information. Meanwhile, the
jammer uses one antenna to harvest energy from the same
information-bearing signal and the other antenna to transmit
jamming signal simultaneously by using the harvested energy,
thanks to the full-duplex capability. Here it is assumed perfect
isolation between the two antennas at the jammer such that
self-interference cancellation is perfect. Note that a small
time lag is needed at the initial frame for such a full-duplex
system, which can be negligible if the whole duration of the
transmission frame is long enough. It is worth noting that
the jamming signal from the jammer not only jams the ER
(potential eavesdropper) but also acts as a source to power
the ER. We assume that the system has N SCs. The channel
power gains on SC n from the Tx to IR, ER and jammer are
denoted as hI,n, hE,n and hJ,n, respectively, and the channel
power gains from the jammer to IR and ER are denoted as
gI,n and gE,n.
Assume that the total transmit power of the Tx is P and the
power transmitted by the Tx and jammer on SC n are denoted
as pn and qn, respectively. In addition, we consider that there
is a peak power constraint on pn and qn, i.e., 0 ≤ pn ≤ p¯,
0 ≤ qn ≤ q¯ for n = 1, · · · , N . The total transmit power
constraint at the Tx can be given by
N∑
n=1
pn ≤ P. (1)
As the energy-free jammer is powered by the information
signal sent from the Tx, the transmit power qn of the jammer
is constrained by
N∑
n=1
qn ≤ ζ
N∑
n=1
pnhJ,n, (2)
where ζ is energy conversion efficiency and we assume that
ζ = 1 for convenience in the next.
The harvested power at the ER comprises of two compo-
nents with one from the Tx and the other from the jammer,
which should satisfy the minimum requirement Q:
N∑
n=1
(pnhE,n + qngE,n) ≥ Q. (3)
We assume that the jamming signal transmitted by the
jammer can be cancelled at the IR but cannot be removed at
the ER. This can be practically justified by the similar method
in [8]: A large set of random sequences (jamming signals)
with Gaussian distribution are pre-stored at the jammer and
their indices are the keys. The jammer randomly selects a
sequence (jamming signal) and sends its key to the IR over
each SC n. The key can be sent in a secret manner via channel
independence and reciprocity. As the random sequence is only
known at the IR, any potential eavesdropper cannot access the
random sequence at each SC. With this scheme, the achievable
information rate of the IR and ER on SC n can be respectively
given by
rn = log2
(
1 +
pnhI,n
σ2
)
, ren = log2
(
1 +
pnhE,n
σ2 + qngE,n
)
.
(4)
Then the secrecy rate on SC n is given by
Rn = [rn − r
e
n]
+ =
{
rn − r
e
n, if qn ≥ An
0, otherwise,
(5)
where [·]+ , max(0, ·) and An ,
[
σ2(hE,n−hI,n)
hI,ngE,n
]+
.
We consider the instantaneous secrecy rate maximization
by jointly optimizing the transmit power of the Tx and
jammer while maintaining the energy harvesting requirement
of the ER. The optimization problem can be mathematically
formulated as:
(P1) : max
{pn,qn}
N∑
n=1
Rn (6a)
s.t. (1)− (3),
0 ≤ pn ≤ p¯, 0 ≤ qn ≤ q¯, ∀n. (6b)
(P1) is non-convex since the rate expression (5) is non-
concave in the power variables. However, it is easy to verify
that (P1) satisfies the so-called time-sharing condition, and
thus (P1) has zero duality-gap. This means that (P1) can be
solved optimally by the Lagrange duality method. In next
section, we apply the Lagrange duality method to solve (P1).
III. OPTIMAL ALGORITHM
At first, the lagrangian of (P1) is expressed as
L({pn}, {qn}, λ, β, µ) =
N∑
n=1
Rn + λ
(
P −
N∑
n=1
pn
)
(7)
+ β
( N∑
n=1
pnhJ,n −
N∑
n=1
qn
)
+ µ
( N∑
n=1
(pnhE,n + qngE,n)−Q
)
,
where λ, β and µ are the non-negative dual variables
associated with the corresponding constraints (1), (2) and (3),
respectively. Then, the dual function g(λ, β, µ) of (P1) is
defined as
max
0≤p≤p¯,0≤q≤q¯
L({pn}, {qn}, λ, β, µ). (8)
The dual problem is thus given by
min
λ≥0,β≥0,µ≥0
g(λ, β, µ). (9)
With a given set of {λ, β, µ}, the maximization problem in
(8) can be decomposed into N parallel subproblems all having
the same structure and each for one SC. By dropping the index
n for brevity, each subproblem is given by
L(p, q) = R− λp+ β(phJ − q) + µ(phE + qgE). (10)
In the next, we jointly optimize p and q in two different cases
depending on R ≥ 0 or R = 0 in (5).
When q ≥ A: We define f1(p, q) ,
∂L
∂p
, f2(p, q) ,
∂L
∂q
and χ(·) is the real nonnegative root of f1(p, q) = 0 and/or
f2(p, q) = 0. Then the optimal solution (p, q) in this case is
given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The optimal solution of (P1) with q ≥ A is
given by
3If f1(0, A) ≤ f1(0, q¯) ≤ 0,
p = 0, q =
{
A, if −β + µgE < 0
q¯, otherwise.
If f1(0, q¯) ≥ f1(0, A) ≥ 0

p = p¯, q = χ(f2(p¯, q)), if f1(p¯, A) ≥ 0
(p, q) = χ(f1(p, q), f2(p, q)), if f1(p¯, q¯) ≤ 0
(p, q) = argmax
(p,q)∈Υ1
L(p, q), otherwise,
where Υ1 is denoted as
Υ1 =
{
(p, q) = χ(f1(p, q), f2(p, q)), A ≤ q ≤ χ(f1(p¯, q))
p = p¯, q = χ(f2(p¯, q)), χ(f1(p¯, q)) ≤ q ≤ q¯.
If f1(0, A) ≤ 0 ≤ f1(0, q¯)

(p, q) = argmax
(p,q)∈Υ2
L(p, q), if f1(p¯, q¯) ≤ 0
(p, q) = argmax
(p,q)∈Υ3
L(p, q), otherwise,
where Υ2 and Υ3 are given by
Υ2 =


p = 0, q =
{
A,−β + µgE < 0
χ(f1(0, q)), otherwise.
A ≤ q ≤ χ(f1(0, q))
(p, q) = χ(f1(p, q), f2(p, q)), χ(f1(0, q)) ≤ q ≤ q¯.
Υ3 =


p = 0, q =
{
A,−β + µgE < 0
χ(f1(0, q)), otherwise.
A ≤ q ≤ χ(f1(0, q))
(p, q) = χ(f1(p, q), f2(p, q)), χ(f1(0, q)) ≤ q ≤ χ(f1(p¯, q))
p = p¯, q = χ(f2(p¯, q)), χ(f1(p¯, q)) ≤ q ≤ q¯.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
When q < A: R = 0 in this case, thus (10) becomes a linear
function of p and q. Hence, the optimal solution is given by
p =
{
0, if− λ+ βhJ + µhE < 0,
p¯, otherwise.
q =
{
0, if− β + µgE < 0,
A, otherwise.
Obtaining the optimal p and q in each region, and we can
select the (p∗, q∗) which achieves the largest value of L(p, q)
in (10) as the optimal solution with given dual variables.
Finally, we update the dual variables using ellipsoid method
due to the fact that P −
∑N
n=1 pn,
∑N
n=1 pnhJ,n −
∑N
n=1 qn
and
∑N
n=1
(
pnhE,n+ qnhE,n
)
−Q are the subgradients of λ,
β and µ, respectively.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We set up N = 64 SCs, the noise power σ2 = −60 dBm
and the pass-loss exponent is 3. The peak power constraints
p¯ = q¯ = 2P/N . The Tx, jammer, and IR are on one straight
line and the distance from the Tx to IR is 20 m. The jammer
moves from the Tx to the IR, and the distance between the
Tx and jammer is denoted as d1. Besides, we assume that
the distance from the Tx to ER is 10 m with 30 degrees.
For comparison, we introduce three benchmark schemes: the
jamming signal cannot be cancelled at both IR and ER (a
near-optimal solution is obtained by block-coordinate descent
method), without jammer, and the equal power allocation
(EPA) applied at both Tx and jammer.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the secrecy rate versus the harvested
energy constraint Q with the total transmit power of Tx set
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Fig. 2: Secrecy rate versus required harvested power, with P = 30 dBm.
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Fig. 3: Secrecy rate versus the total transmit power and d1, with Q = 100µW.
as P = 30 dBm and d1 = 10 m. First, for all schemes,
the secrecy rate is observed to decrease with Q. It is also
observed that the proposed scheme outperforms the other
three benchmark schemes significantly. The EPA shows good
performance with small energy requirement while becomes
infeasible when Q becomes larger (Q > 0.7 mW). Moreover,
the scheme without jammer has the worst performance which
has almost zero secrecy rate. This is because that the ER
is located nearly to the Tx and thus possesses much better
channel gains compared with the IR, thus the secrecy is unable
to be guaranteed.
Fig. 3 illustrates the secrecy information rate versus the the
total transmit power P with the harvested energy requirement
Q = 100 µW and d1 = 10 m. It also shows that the proposed
optimal scheme achieves considerable gain compared with
the other three benchmark schemes. When d1 varies, the
performance of the proposed scheme and EPA are observed
to decrease with the distance d1. This may be because that
the jamming signals become weaker as the harvested energy
of the jammer will decrease with a longer distance d1 even
if the channel gains from the jammer to the IR increases.
Besides, the proposed scheme with AN cancellation at IR can
achieve positive secrecy rate over a wide range compared with
the scheme “IR&ER NoCancel”, which also demonstrates the
superiority of the proposed scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper studied optimal power allocation in secure
OFDM-based SWIPT system with the help of a wireless-
4powered friendly jammer. The joint power allocation of the
Tx and jammer were optimized to maximize the secrecy rate
while satisfying the harvested power constraint. We derived the
optimal solution to solve the considered non-convex problem.
Finally, the superiority of the proposed scheme was verified
by the numerical results.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
As we define that
f1(p, q) ,
hI
ln 2(σ2 + phI)
−
hE
ln 2(σ2 + qgE + phE)
− λ+ βhJ + µhE , (11)
f2(p, q) ,
phEgE
ln 2(σ2 + qgE + phE)(σ2 + qgE)
− β + µgE .
(12)
We can easily prove that (11) is a monotonic decreasing
function with p, thus we have f1(p¯, q) ≤ f1(p, q) ≤ f1(0, q).
In addition, f1(p, q) is a monotonic increasing function of q in
[A, q¯]. There are three cases about the sign of f1(0, q) which
will be discussed in the following.
Case I: f1(0, A) ≤ f1(0, q¯) ≤ 0. In this case, f1(p, q) ≤
f1(0, q) ≤ f1(0, q¯) ≤ 0, thus p = 0. Therefore, f2(0, q)
becomes a linear function of q, thus the optimal q can be
given by
q =
{
A, if − β + µgE < 0,
q¯, otherwise.
(13)
Case II: f1(0, q¯) ≥ f1(0, A) ≥ 0. In this case, f1(0, q) ≥
f1(0, A) ≥ 0. In order to figure out the sign of f1(p, q), there
are three subcases for f1(p¯, q) as follows:
• Case II-i: f1(p¯, q¯) ≥ f1(p¯, A) ≥ 0. In this subcase,
f1(p, q) ≥ f1(p¯, q) ≥ f1(p¯, A) ≥ 0, thus the optimal so-
lution of p is p = p¯. Then the solution is q = χ(f2(p¯, q))
which can be found by the bisection over [A, q¯].
• Case II-ii: f1(p¯, A) ≤ f1(p¯, q¯) ≤ 0. In this sub-
case, f1(p¯, q) ≤ f1(p¯, q¯) ≤ 0. The solution is
χ(f1(p, q), f2(p, q)). We can first eliminate p in f2(p, q)
and then find the optimal q by numerical search over
[0, q¯].
• Case II-iii: f1(p¯, A) ≤ 0 ≤ f1(p¯, q¯). In this subcase,
f1(p¯, q) is not always positive or negative. We have
f1(p¯, q) ≥ 0 when q ≥ χ(f1(p¯, q)) and f1(p¯, q) < 0
otherwise. Therefore:
Region 1: A ≤ q < χ(f1(p¯, q)). At this region,
f1(p¯, q) < 0. Similar to Case II-ii, the optimal solution
(p, q) at this region is given by χ(f1(p, q), f2(p, q)).
Region 2: χ(f1(p¯, q)) ≤ q ≤ q¯. At this region, f1(p, q) ≥
f1(p¯, q) ≥ 0. Similar to Case II-i, we have p = p¯ and
q = χ(f2(p¯, q)) which can be found over [χ(f1(p¯, q)), q¯].
The optimal solution can be found via a simple search
over Υ1 which defined as a set consisting the optimal
solutions of the above two regions of case II-iii.
Case III: f1(0, A) ≤ 0 ≤ f1(0, q¯). In this case, f1(0, q)
is not always positive or negative. We can easily get that
f1(0, q) ≤ 0 when q ≤ χ(f1(0, q)) and f1(0, q) > 0
otherwise.
• Case III-i: f1(p¯, A) ≤ f1(p¯, q¯) ≤ 0. In this subcase,
f1(p¯, q) ≤ f1(p¯, q¯) ≤ 0. According to the sign of
f1(0, q), we obtain the optimal p and q in the following
two regions.
Region 1:A ≤ q ≤ χ(f1(0, q)). In this region, f1(p, q) ≤
f1(0, q) ≤ 0 and the optimal p is given by p = 0. Similar
to Case I, the optimal q is given by
q =
{
A, if − β + µgE < 0,
χ(f1(0, q)), otherwise.
(14)
Region 2: χ(f1(0, q)) ≤ q ≤ q¯. In this region, f1(0, q) ≥
0. Similar to Case II-ii, the optimal solution is given by
χ(f1(p, q), f2(p, q)).
Therefore, we define Υ2 consisting the optimal solutions
of the above two region and the optimal solution of this
case can be given by a simple search over Υ2.
• Case III-ii: f1(p¯, A) ≤ 0 ≤ f1(p¯, q¯). In this subcase,
similar to f1(0, q), f1(p¯, q) is not always positive or
negative. Since f1(p¯, q) ≤ f1(0, q), we can easily have
χ(f1(p¯, q)) ≥ χ(f1(0, q)). In the following, We jointly
optimize p and q in the following three regions.
Region 1:A ≤ q ≤ χ(f1(0, q)). In this region, f1(p, q) ≤
f1(0, q) ≤ 0, thus the optimal p is given by p = 0, and
the optimal q is given by (14).
Region 2: χ(f1(0, q)) ≤ q ≤ χ(p¯, q)). In this region,
f1(0, q) ≥ 0 and f1(p¯, q) ≤ 0. Similar to Case II-ii, we
have χ(f1(p, q), f2(p, q)) as the solution of this region.
Region 3: χ(f1(p¯, q)) ≤ q ≤ q¯. In this region, f1(p, q) ≥
f1(p¯, q) ≥ 0. Similar to Case II-i, we have p = p¯ and q =
χ(f2(p¯, q)) which can be obtained over [χ(f1(p¯, q)), q¯].
As a result, the optimal solution of Case III-ii can be
found over Υ3 which consisting the three solutions given
in the above regions.
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